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 The Geography of Asset Trade and the Euro: Insiders and Outsiders 
 





This paper analyzes the determinants of cross-border asset trade on cross-country data 
and a Swedish data set. We focus our analysis on the impact of the euro for the 
determinants of bond trade, equity and banking assets. With the help of a theoretical 
model, we attempt to disentangle the different effects that the euro may have had on 
asset holdings for both euro zone countries and countries outside of the euro zone such 
as Sweden. We find evidence that the euro has implied 1) a unilateral financial 
liberalization which makes it cheaper for all countries to buy euro zone assets. For 
bonds and equity holdings, this would translate into approximately 14% and 17% 
decrease in transaction costs. Using Swedish data, we find that this effect of the euro is 
larger for flows than for stocks. 2) a preferential financial liberalization which on top of 
the previous effect has decreased transaction costs inside the euro zone by 
approximately 17% and 10% for bonds and equity respectively. 3) a diversion effect due 
to the fact that lower transaction costs inside the euro zone have led euro countries to 
purchase less equity from outside the euro zone. Our empirical analysis also suggests 
that the elasticity of substitution between bonds inside the euro zone is higher than 
between bonds denominated in different currencies. We illustrate this effect for 
transaction costs generated by the difference in the legal system. 
 





Cet article analyse l’impact de l’intégration monétaire en Europe sur les échanges 
internationaux d’actifs financiers (actions, obligations et actifs bancaires). A partir d’un 
modèle théorique, nous identifions les différents canaux par lesquels l’introduction de 
l’euro peut avoir modifié l’allocation géographique des actifs financiers, pour les pays 
de la zone euro mais aussi pour les pays à l’extérieur de la zone euro. Empiriquement, 
nous trouvons : 
1)  une libéralisation financière unilatérale ; l’euro a augmenté les achats d’actifs de 
la zone euro pour tous les pays du monde. 
2)  une libéralisation financière préférentielle ; l’euro a réduit les coûts de 
transaction à l’intérieur même de la zone euro. 
3)  un effet diversion ; la baisse des coûts de transaction à l’intérieur de la zone euro 
a rendu les actifs des pays extérieurs à l’euro moins attractifs pour les pays de l’euro. 
Enfin, notre analyse empirique suggère aussi que l’euro a augmenté l’élasticité de 
substitution entre obligations de la zone euro. 
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the determinants of cross-border asset trade on cross-country data and a
Swedish data set. We focus our analysis on the impact of the euro for the determinants of bond
trade, equity and banking assets. With the help of a theoretical model, we attempt to disentangle
the di®erent e®ects that the euro may have had on asset holdings for both euro zone countries and
countries outside of the euro zone such as Sweden. We ¯nd evidence that the euro has implied
1) a unilateral ¯nancial liberalization which makes it cheaper for all countries to buy euro zone
assets. For bonds and equity holdings, this would translate into approximately 14% and 17% decrease
in transaction costs. Using Swedish data, we ¯nd that this e®ect of the euro is larger for °ows
than for stocks. 2) a preferential ¯nancial liberalization which on top of the previous e®ect has
decreased transaction costs inside the euro zone by approximately 17% and 10% for bonds and equity
respectively. 3) a diversion e®ect due to the fact that lower transaction costs inside the euro zone
have led euro countries to purchase less equity from outside the euro zone. Our empirical analysis also
suggests that the elasticity of substitution between bonds inside the euro zone is higher than between
bonds denominated in di®erent currencies. We illustrate this e®ect for transaction costs generated by
the di®erence in the legal system.
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11 Introduction
Financial integration has been one the major trends characterizing the world economy in the recent past
and partially explains the increase in cross-border asset holdings. All industrialized countries have been
a®ected by this process. The creation of the euro can at least partially be interpreted as a®ecting this
process of ¯nancial integration but in an asymmetric way for countries inside and outside the euro zone.
From that point of view, an interesting question is to what extent the euro can be considered as unilateral
or preferential ¯nancial liberalization. The question is important especially for countries outside the euro
zone but which trade a lot with the euro. If one believes that ¯nancial integration and ¯nancial °ows
generate gains in terms of risk diversi¯cation and allocation e±ciency, it is important to estimate both
the opportunity cost of being outside the euro zone and the cost or gain of the creation the euro for
outsiders.
To analyze these questions we use two data sets: a cross-country one on bilateral asset holdings and a
Swedish data set on both holdings of foreign assets and out°ows. Sweden is interesting to study because
it is a very open country for both trade and ¯nancial °ows, it is a member of the largest and most
integrated regional trade agreement, the European Union, but at the same time remains an outsider of
the euro zone.
Our paper is very much related to the analysis of Lane (2006) on the impact of EMU on bond
portfolios. It also builds on recent papers that have analyzed the ¯nancial gravity equation such as Portes
and Rey (2005), Portes, Oh and Rey (2001) and Aviat and Coeurdacier (2005). De Santis and Gerard
(2006) also analyze the impact of EMU on portfolio weights rebalancing.
Our additional contribution is both theoretical and empirical. Based on the model of Martin and Rey
(2004 and 2006), we derive a testable ¯nancial gravity equation that informs us on the di®erent potential
e®ects of the euro on cross border asset holding. Empirically, we analyze, not only the determinants
of bond holdings, but also of equity and banking assets. Also, we attempt to disentangle the di®erent
e®ects that the euro may have had on asset holdings for both euro zone countries and countries outside
of the euro zone. In theory, the euro may have had several e®ects on the cost of transacting assets: on
transactions inside the euro zone, on purchases of euro assets by countries outside the euro zone and on
purchases of non euro assets by euro countries. As in trade theory, these changes in transaction costs may
also have resulted in diversion. In addition, and as noted by Lane (2006), the euro may have increased
the elasticity of substitution between assets of the euro zone. This actually has a negative e®ect on the
holdings of euro assets by countries in the euro zone. The reason is that the increased elasticity magni¯es
the impact of any remaining transaction cost (due to di®erent legal systems in the euro zone for example)
on cross-border holdings of euro assets in the euro zone. Hence, at least theoretically, it is not obvious
that the euro increases the cross-border demand for assets inside the euro zone. We attempt to analyze
2these di®erent e®ects from a theoretical point of view and quantify those with the help of cross-country
data on asset holdings and Swedish data on foreign asset purchases. We ¯nd evidence that the euro has
a®ected both transaction costs and the elasticity of substitution but the e®ect is di®erent for di®erent
classes of assets and also di®erent whether countries are in or out of the euro zone. In particular, we ¯nd
that transaction costs have decreased inside the euro zone.
Our estimates (which depend on the elasticity of substitution between assets) suggest that the trans-
action cost to buy assets from the euro zone has decreased by around 17% for equity and 14% for bonds.
This has bene¯ted both those countries that are in and outside of the euro zone. On top of this e®ect,
those countries inside the euro zone bene¯ted from a decrease of transaction costs for bonds and equities
respectively of around 17% and 10% . Hence, for a country inside the euro zone the transaction cost for
the cross border purchase of a euro bond or equity has decreased by around 31% and 24% respectively.
The euro can be interpreted as both preferential and unilateral ¯nancial liberalization. This resembles
some recent results (see Baldwin (2006) and Flam and Nordstrom (2003)) in the literature on the euro
e®ect on trade in goods. However, contrary to this literature we ¯nd no e®ect that the euro has decreased
the transaction cost for euro countries of purchasing equity outside the euro zone. In fact, for equities we
¯nd evidence that some diversion has taken place in the sense that euro countries buy less equities from
outside the euro zone. This evidence is based on comparing asset trade between euro countries and the
nordic countries in (Finland) and out (Sweden, Norway, Denmark) of the euro zone. This diversion e®ect
does not come from an absolute increase in transaction costs for buying assets from the rest of the world
but from a relative cost e®ect. On Swedish data, we also con¯rm that the euro worked like unilateral
liberalization: the portfolio bias towards the euro zone is found quantitatively large for equity and bond
holdings. Interestingly, we also ¯nd that this bias (and presumably the transaction cost decrease that
causes it) is larger for °ows than for stocks.
Finally, our empirical analysis suggests that the elasticity of substitution between bonds inside the
euro zone is higher than between bonds denominated in di®erent currencies. Our estimate is that it is
almost three times higher. This actually depresses cross border asset holdings in the euro zone as it
magni¯es the negative impact of remaining transaction costs in the euro. We illustrate this e®ect for
transaction costs generated by the di®erence in the legal system.
The ¯rst section introduces a simple theoretical framework in order to generate testable ¯nancial
gravity equations. We then present empirical evidence on determinants of cross border ¯nancial asset
holdings and in particular the e®ect of the euro on both insiders and outsiders. We do this by using both
a cross country data set and a data set on Swedish holdings of foreign assets and Swedish capital out°ows.
32 Theoretical framework
We use a simpli¯ed version of Martin and Rey (2004 and 2006) to derive a gravity equation for interna-
tional trade in assets with ¯nancial transaction costs
1. There are N countries populated with Li (i 2 N)
risk averse agents who live for two periods. Agents are endowed with projects and assets correspond to
claims on those risky projects. The number of traded assets (nj for country j) is therefore taken to be
exogenous here (in Martin and Rey (2006), it is endogenous). The number of shares per asset is normal-
ized to one. The cost of an asset issued by an agent in country j and bought by an agent in country i
is pj¿ij where pj is the price of the asset and (¿ij ¡ 1) is the bilateral ¯nancial transaction cost between
the two countries. As in the trade literature, the simplifying assumption is that this cost takes a iceberg
form meaning here that the transaction fee is paid in units of the asset itself. We have a very broad
interpretation of these transaction costs which include currency risk, trading and liquidity related costs,
taxation di®erentials, di®erences in accounting and legal standards, and information asymmetry.
In the second period, there are Z exogenous and equally likely states of nature (the number of states
of nature is assumed to be larger that the number of traded assets), and the realization is revealed at
the beginning of that period after all decisions have been taken. As in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)
and Martin and Rey (2004), the technology implies that each project gives dividends in only one state
of nature. In all other states of nature, the dividends are zero. All risky claims to operating pro¯ts are
traded on the stock market at the end of period one, so that each claim corresponds to an Arrow-Debreu
asset. No duplication occurs in equilibrium so that each investment/asset in the world is unique
2. This
modelling introduces a simple incentive for agents to diversify their portfolios.
A representative agent in country i maximizes utility subject to the ¯rst period budget constraint (in
second period consumption is the dividend of shares purchased in ¯rst period):
Max E(Ui)
C1i;C2i;sij































which is of the non-expected form introduced by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990). This allows
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (which we assume to be 1 for simplicity) to be di®erent from
the coe±cient of relative risk aversion (1=") . C1i and C2i are consumption in ¯rst and second period
respectively. yi is per capita income and silj is the demand by an agent of country i for the asset of agent
1See also Aviat and Coeurdacier (2006) for a derivation of ¯nancial gravity equation in related framework.
2In Martin and Rey (2006) where the number of assets is endogenous, this is shown to be an equilibrium as agents have
no incentive to replicate an existing asset.
4lj of country j. Remember that assets are all di®erent in the sense that they give dividends in di®erent
states of nature (this is the reason why agents want to diversify their portfolio and buy all existing assets)
but they are symmetric in the sense that they all give in only one state of nature. This symmetry implies
that the \typical" demand by an agent of country i for an asset of country j can be denoted as: silj = sij:
Note that for the second period, this utility function is similar to the one introduced by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) to represent preferences for di®erentiated products and " can be interpreted as the elasticity
of substitution between assets. In what follows, we impose " > 1 to have ¯nancial home bias and realistic
asset demands.
If we call rj = dj=pjZ, the expected return of asset j, the value of the aggregate demand by country
i agents for assets issued in country j is (exclusive of transaction costs):


















Note that as in the trade literature a \price index" Qi speci¯c to each country appears in the demand
for assets. We can think of it in our context as a ¯nancial price index for all assets that compete with
the imported asset. It measures ¯nancial remoteness (see Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Head
and Mayer (2004) for the trade version). A country with a low Qi (for example because its own ¯nancial
markets are very diversi¯ed and it issues many assets) is a country to which (for a given relative return
and bilateral transaction cost) it is di±cult to sell ¯nancial assets. Note that an empirical di±culty (again
common to the trade in goods literature) is that this price index is supposed to contain all potential asset
suppliers in the world.
What are the e®ects of the euro in this theoretical context? The euro can most obviously be interpreted
as a decrease in transaction costs ¿ij between two countries i and j inside the euro zone. This should
increase the cross-border demand of euro assets by euro countries. Note that this decreases the \¯nancial"
price index Qi of the euro countries and therefore exerts a negative impact on the demand by euro
countries for assets outside the euro zone.
However, we may also think that the euro makes it easier for non euro countries to buy euro assets,
which we would interpret as a decrease in ¿hj where country j is in the euro but not h. This increases the
demand for euro assets. Symmetrically, the euro could make it easier for euro countries to buy non-euro
assets (a decrease in ¿jh where country j is in the euro but not h).
Finally, it is intuitive to believe that the euro has also increased the elasticity of substitution between
assets of the euro zone. The reason is that with a single monetary policy the correlation between asset
returns (dividends and even more so interest rates) should increase. This e®ect is not straightforward to
capture in our simple model because the elasticity of substitution between assets is the same for all assets
and is the inverse of the coe±cient of relative risk aversion which is the same for all agents. However,
5it should still be true that for two countries i and j, the demand by country j for assets of country i
depends on the interaction between bilateral transaction costs ¿ij and the speci¯c elasticity of substitution
between these two countries "ij in the following way: (¿ij)
1¡"ij. This has important implications. Suppose
we divide bilateral transaction costs into those related to the euro and all others related to cross-border
asset transactions that are not a®ected by the euro (for example the di®erence in legal systems among
euro zone countries). For a country pair inside the euro zone, transaction costs are lower so this should
exert a positive impact on their bilateral cross border asset holdings. However, the negative impact of
di®erence in legal systems ¿ij will be magni¯ed by the introduction of the euro if we believe that "ij is
larger for euro zone countries.
We are now ready to produce the ¯nancial version of the gravity equation for the holdings of assets of
country j by country i (ignoring constants and assuming for the moment that the elasticity of substitution
is the same for all countries) which will the base of our empirical speci¯cation:
log(Assetij) = logLiyi + lognj ¡ (" ¡ 1)log¿ij + (" ¡ 1)logrj + (" ¡ 1)logQi (2)
The ¯rst term is a size factor and corresponds to GDP of country i. The second one is the number of
assets in country j. This latter variable may be related to economic size (GDP and market capitalization)
but also to the ¯nancial sophistication of the country that may be linked to its status as a recognized
¯nancial center. In Martin and Rey (2006) where the number of assets issued by a country is endogenous
it is shown to increase with the income of the country and with ¯nancial openness of the country when
the country is relatively rich. The third term indicates that transaction costs between the two countries
have a negative impact on asset holdings. The e®ect depends on the elasticity of substitution which may
be di®erent for di®erent assets: typically higher for bonds than for equities. The fourth term implies
that countries with high expected returns should get more demand for their assets. The last term is the
¯nancial price index which is speci¯c to each country. Note that only one variable is country pair speci¯c:
the bilateral transaction costs and we will focus our attention on the determinants of those costs in the
empirical section. All other terms are country speci¯c. Note also that, in a given class of assets (bonds
or equities), the reaction of the demand to a change in transaction costs depends on "; the elasticity of
substitution between assets. It therefore assumes that this elasticity is not a®ected by the change in the
transaction cost itself. In the case of the euro, we will need to relax this assumption as the euro is both




Following our theoretical model, we propose two identi¯cation strategies to test equation (2).
² Speci¯cation (a)
First, we estimate the following equation using only country i ¯xed-e®ects (®i). We use the GDP
of country j (GDPj) for the market size (nj) of the \destination" country (the country that sells the
asset and imports capital). We also proxy the ¯nancial sophistication of market (j) by the ratio of
stock market capitalisation over GDP (
MktCap
GDP )j. We do not have to proxy the market size (Liyi) for
the \source" country (the country that buys the assets and exports capital) since it is included in the
¯xed-e®ect (®i). Expected returns in country j are approximated by the log of the average gross equity
return in US$ over the period 1990-2001 (log rj).
log(Assetij) = ®i + ¯ log(GDPj) + °(
MktCap
GDP
)j + (" ¡ 1)logZij + (" ¡ 1)logrj




ij exp(±2euroij + ±3commonlangij + ±4legalij:::)
where dij is the bilateral distance, euroij, commonlangij, legalij are dummies that indicate that both
countries belong to the euro zone, share a common language and a common legal system. We describe
these in more detail in the next section.
To analyze the impact of the euro on the elasticity of substitution between assets inside the euro zone,
we will add an interaction term between the euro dummy and the identity of the legal system.
The use of ¯xed-e®ects in the source country dimension (i) allow us to control for for the ¯nancial
price index Qi. Indeed, as shown by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) (see also Baldwin and Taglioni
(2006)), this strategy control for the \multilateral resistance term" (Qi). Since transaction costs a®ect the
¯nancial price index, the omission of source country ¯xed-e®ects might bias the the estimated coe±cient
on our transaction cost variables. This speci¯cation has the main advantage to keep variability in two
dimensions (country j and bilateral dimension). Strictly speaking, this equation is the exact counterpart
of equation (2). This is our preferred speci¯cation since we control for the ¯nancial remoteness of country
(i) and we keep a reasonable number of parameters to estimate. However, without ¯xed-e®ect in the
country (j) dimension, we might not control perfectly for some unobservable country-speci¯c factors that
can a®ect international asset holdings. In order to deal with this issue, we will add a large set of control
7and dummy variables in the country (j) dimension (¯nancial sophistication, corruption index, presence
of tax havens and ¯nancial centers in the sample and some regional dummies).
In the second speci¯cation, we control for ¯xed-e®ects in both dimensions.
² Speci¯cation (b)
We add ¯xed-e®ects in the destination country (j) dimension:
log(Assetij) = ®i + ®j + (" ¡ 1)logZij
In this case, only the impact of the dyadic variables Zij can be estimated.
3.2 Data description
3.3 Cross country data
Our data set concerns the year 2001
3 and our sample contains 27 \source" countries (j) and 61 \desti-
nation" countries (j)
4.
To estimate \gravity equation" of bilateral international asset holdings, we use two di®erent data
sources for asset holdings: ¯rst, we use the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) in 2001
5
provided by the Imf which geographically breaks down securities holdings (bonds
6 and equities). The
associated dependant variables are (Equityij) which is the log- of aggregate equity holdings in country
(j) of investors in country (i) (in US dollars) and (Bondij) which is the log- of aggregate bond holdings in
country (j) of investors in country (i) (in USD). Second, we use data on bilateral banking ¯nancial assets
in 2001 provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS): the BIS issues quarterly the interna-
tional claims of its reporting banks on individual countries, geographically broken down by nationality
of reporting banks
7. Unfortunately, this dataset includes only 19 \source" countries (j) among the 27
countries used from the CPIS data. The dependant variable (BankAssetij) is the log of banking claims
in country (j) held by banks of country (i) (expressed in US dollars). This data partially overlaps data
on negotiable securities since around one third of banking assets are bonds and equities but include a
large part of bank lending (around two thirds
8) which are excluded from the CPIS dataset.
We use the log- of \destination" countries Gdp (GDPj) to control for market size
9. The GDP is
3Although using panel data would be more appropriate but we are restricted by our data set on international ¯nancial
claims.
4We restricted our sample according to missing values on bilateral asset holdings and data availability for control
variables. See appendix for a country list.
5Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Data, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm
6Bond holdings include Long{Term Debt Securities and Short{Term Debt Securities
7See http://www.bis.org/statistics/histstats10.htm. To get more robust results, we averaged quarterly data for portfolio
stocks in 2001.
8see appendix for a more precise description of the BIS dataset
9Some might argue that market capitalization could be a better proxy for the Gravity Model of Equity Holdings but no
one of our results were a®ected by this choice. Moreover we control for the ratio of stock market capitalisation over GDP.
We ¯rst added Gdp/Capita in the regressions to better control for the development of ¯nancial markets but the results
were mixed because of interaction with the corruption variable.
8expressed in current US dollars. We also control for the ¯nancial sophistication of the destination country
using the stock market capitalisation over GDP
10.
We use stock market data (monthly stock prices in US $ from 1990 to 2001 of the main stock market
index of the country
11) to compute the log of the average gross stock returns of country j (Retj) over
the period. We will not use these series of returns to explain bilateral bond holdings since bond holdings
are mainly public bonds but unfortunately we do not have data on bond prices for a large sample of
countries
12.
Our focus is on the determinants of the bilateral transaction costs. Since variables related to the
°ows of information between markets, bilateral trade intensity and the quality of institutions have been
shown to perform well in gravity equation for asset trade, we include the following determinants of the
geographical allocation of asset holdings (see Portes and Rey (2005), Aviat and Coeurdacier (2005), Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2004)):
We use the log of distance between the two main cities of country pairs (Distanceij) since it might
proxy for some transaction costs between markets (Portes and Rey (2005)).
We use a \Common Language" dummy (CommonLangij) if country i and country j share the same
language
13.
We use a dummy for the proximity of legal systems from La Porta et al. (1997,1998)]. We distinguish
between \common law" systems (or \English law"), \French law", \German law" and \Swedish law".
The dummy variable Legalij equals one when source and destination countries have the same legal system.
Indeed, legal system similarities might also reduce information asymmetries and contracting costs.
We also control for bilateral goods trade between countries. The variable (Tradeij) is the log of
bilateral imports from country (j) to country (i) that is not due to market sizes. In other word, this is
the residual of the regression of bilateral imports on GDPi and GDPj
14. The data on international trade
°ows come from the dataset Chelem (Cepii, Paris).
We use an index of corruption for the \destination" country (Corruptionj) since it is likely that
hidden bribes reduce transactions in international markets. This index is developed by Transparency
International
15 and gives some insights on the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics
and risk analysts.
10We use past data (from 2000) to reduce endogeneity issues
11Data on stock returns are from Martin and Rey [2002] and Global Financial Data.
12However this is less an issue than for equity returns since there is much less variability in bond returns across countries.
One could also argue that equity returns might not be the relevant variable for banking assets given that a large share of
cross-border banking assets is made of bank loans but we cannot provide better data on banking portfolios returns.
13We also constructed a \Colonial Link" dummy which was equal to one if country (j) was a former colony of country
(i) (or vice-versa) but this variable was almost never signi¯cant so we drop it from our regressions.
14We normalize trade by market sizes in order to have a correct estimate of the impact of countries GDPs on bilateral
asset holdings. In non-reported regressions, we used exports from (i) to (j) or the average of imports and exports but none
of the results were a®ected.
15http://www.transparency.org, \Corruption Perception Index"
9To control for the impact of the Euro on bilateral asset holdings, we construct the following dummies:
Euroij is equal to one when both countries belong to the Euro zone and zero otherwise, and Euroj is
equal to one when the destination country (j) belongs to the Euro zone but not the source country (i)
16.
We will also make some robustness checks by controlling for the impact of the European Union: Eurcomij
is equal to one when both countries belong to the European Union.
We add a variable TaxHavenj to control for destination countries with very favorable ¯scal treatment
and FinCenterj to control for the presence of ¯nancial centers in our data. The variable (TaxHavenj)
equals one if the destination country is considered as a tax haven and zero otherwise
17. Similarly, the
variable FinCenterj equals one if the country is considered as a ¯nancial center. Financial centers are
Luxembourg, Hong-Kong, United Kingdom and Singapore.
Finally, to control for unobservable regional variables that might a®ect bilateral asset holdings, we
add some regional dummies in the \destination country" dimension. We have ¯ve such dummies: Europe,
North America, Central and South America, Africa, Asia and Oceania
18.
3.4 Results
The results of the two speci¯cations are shown in table 1 and 2. The impact of the usual gravity variables
is consistent with those of Portes and Rey (2005), Aviat and Coeurdacier (2005), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2004). The estimated coe±cients on Distanceij, Tradeij, CommonLangij and Legalij all show up with
the expected sign and for most regressions are signi¯cant.
A novel feature of these regressions is that we make comparisons across types of assets. The variables
related to information or legal asymmetries (CommonLangij and Legalij) matter more for equity holdings
and banking assets. This is somehow consistent with the idea that equities and banking assets are more
information intensive assets than bonds. This is especially so because most bonds are public bonds and
not corporate bonds. In both speci¯cations, bilateral equity holdings and banking asset holdings are
more a®ected by the trade intensity between countries than bond holdings. This is consistent with two
competitive explanations that have been brought by the theoretical literature: it is likely that trade
proxies for some information °ows between countries and this is not surprising that it mainly a®ects the
allocation of information intensive assets. A second explanation suggested by Coeurdacier (2005), is that
buying assets of ¯rms that compete with local ¯rms (¯rms that export towards market (i)) are a good
hedge against °uctuations in the performance of local ¯rms in the presence of portfolio home bias.
16Note that due to the presence of ¯xed-e®ects in the dimension (i), we cannot use a variable that is equal to one when
the country (i) is in the euro but not the country (j).
17Countries are considered as tax haven according to the classi¯cation of GAFI (Groupe d'Action Financiµ ere). We
consider ¯ve Tax Havens in our sample, namely Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Panama, Ireland





















































e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .766 .678 .703
e(F) 120.437 65.308 96.096
Table 1: Gravity Models on world asset holdings with source country ¯xed-e®ects.
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by
* (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination

























e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .787 .716 .717
e(F) 744.994 312.073 227.545
Table 2: Gravity Models on world asset holdings with source and destination country ¯xed-e®ects.
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp.
** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country.
11The e®ect of distance on bond holdings is almost twice the e®ect it has for equity and bank assets.
According to the ¯rst speci¯cation, when distance between two markets doubles, bilateral bond holdings
are reduced by 60%, while banking assets by 35% and bilateral equity holdings, the least a®ected, by
25%. This might be surprising since according to Portes and Rey (2005) and Portes, Oh and Rey (2001),
distance proxy some informational costs and then should a®ect to a lower extent trade in public bonds,
which is the largest part of international bond holdings. However, distance may also proxy for transaction
costs (costs of phone calls, of trading assets outside the local ¯nancial markets, di®erent opening hours
of markets...). In this case it would square well with the theoretical framework developed in the ¯rst
section. Indeed, if bonds of di®erent countries are better substitutes than are equities of di®erent countries
(because of risk idiosyncratic to the ¯rm), then we would indeed expect that the coe±cient on transactions
costs is higher (in absolute value) for bonds than for equity. In the theoretical framework, this would
translate into a higher elasticity of demand ("). This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that other
variables that proxy for ¯nancial transaction costs (¯nancial center, corruption and the euro e®ect) have
(in absolute term) a larger e®ect on asset holdings in the case of bonds than in the case of equity.
The Euro E®ect
In the ¯rst speci¯cation we only include country dummies in the source country dimension which
allows us to analyze the impact of the euro on ¯nancial trade not only in the euro zone (through the
variable Euroij) but also between the rest of the world and the euro zone (Euroj).
Table 1 and 2 provide two important regularities in the data related to the impact of the Euro on
international asset portfolios.
First, the euro works like a unilateral ¯nancial liberalization: the positive and signi¯cant coe±cient on
the Euroj dummy in Table 1 means that countries outside of the euro-zone hold more assets supplied
in the euro zone than predicted by the usual variables. This is true for both bonds and bank assets and
to a lesser extent for equity. The portfolio bias towards the euro-zone is large: for equities, investors hold
around 60% more euro assets than predicted by the usual gravity variables and this number goes up to
around 100% for bonds and banking assets. These are very large numbers and one may think that, as
for the early Rose e®ects of the single currency on trade, they are too large to be true. However, ¯rst
remember that this number is not driven by the fact that euro countries are more ¯nancially developed,
have better institutions, are closer to the other main ¯nancial markets (or more integrated in product
markets). We control for these observable characteristics of euro countries as much as possible. One
could also argue that this result is not due to the euro but to some empirical regularity among European
countries: Europe is for some unobservable reasons more attractive for investors than other regions in the
world. However, we control for regional dummies of destination and in particular a dummy for \broad"
12Europe. This variable equals one for a signi¯cant number of Central and Eastern European countries but
creating two di®erent dummies, one for Western Europe and the other for Central and Eastern Europe
did not change any of the result. Both dummies were very similar in absolute terms and non-signi¯cant
19.
Second, the euro works like a preferential ¯nancial agreement. The average country exhibits a euro
bias but this bias is signi¯cantly larger when the two countries are in the euro zone. Quantitatively this
e®ect is also very large but varies across speci¯cations and across assets. We choose to select the one in
Table 2. It should be the best speci¯cation to measure the impact of bilateral variables since we control
for dummies in both the source and destination dimensions. In this case, the euro increases by 150%
bilateral bond holdings between two euro countries while equity holdings rise by around 45%. The impact
on bank assets is not signi¯cant. Again, these results hold once we control for a relatively large set of
variables that might be correlated with being part of the euro (trade linkages, geography...). Although
the value of the estimates of the euro e®ect looks di®erent in the two speci¯cations (Table 1 and 2), the
two speci¯cations provide very similar quantitative results: the reason is that the estimates of table 1 also
include the impact of the euro as an unilateral ¯nancial liberalization (which also a®ects euro countries!).
Hence, the measure of the euro bias within the euro zone (on top of the unilateral ¯nancial liberalization)
is the di®erence between the estimates of Euroij and Euroj. This yields very comparable estimates to
table 2.
The results con¯rm those of Lane (2005) on the positive role of the euro on bond holdings between
countries of the euro zone. Quantitatively, our estimated e®ect on bond holdings is however smaller (150%
versus around 230%). We also ¯nd that the euro e®ect does not hold only for bonds but also for equity
although with a smaller coe±cient. This is not surprising since currency risk is a much larger part of
the asset risk for bonds than for equities. Moreover, if we interpret the euro e®ect as a decrease in the
transaction costs (due to currency risk) then, given that bonds are closer substitutes than equities, we
should expect the impact of the elimination of currency risk to be larger on bonds than on equities. As
we argued in the theoretical model we interpret this as a higher elasticity of demand (") for bonds than
for equities and therefore a larger response of bond holdings to transaction costs.
Interestingly, these two regularities resemble the results obtained in the recent literature (see Baldwin
(2006), Flam and Nordstrom (2003)) on the impact of the euro on trade in goods: the euro acted as a
decrease in transaction costs between euro countries but also between euro countries and the rest of the
world. The former e®ect is especially true for bonds and to a lesser extent for equity while the latter is
true whatever the type of asset.
19We also estimated the model dropping randomly three European countries from the sample of source country since
one might argue that European countries are over-represented in the sample and our estimates might su®er from some
selection bias. The estimates were identical. Actually, even when we drop all euro countries as source countries, the same
bias towards the euro zone exists.
13We then perform robustness checks on the euro e®ect. Controlling for a European Union dummy
(which equals one when both countries belong the European Union and zero otherwise) does not a®ect
our results and the estimated euro e®ect is actually even larger for equities and not signi¯cantly di®erent
for bonds (see appendix, tables 11 and 12). However given the collinearity between these two variables,
one should interpret these results with caution. We also test whether the euro e®ect is due to the existence
of deeper agreements on the taxation of cross-border capital incomes between euro countries. We use data
from Aviat and Coeurdacier (2005) about the international taxation of capital available for a restricted
number of countries
20. Indeed, although most of the countries we study have a residence{based tax system,
they charge withholding taxes when foreigners repatriate dividends, capital gains or interests. To limit
double{taxation, several bilateral tax treaties regulate those withholding taxes (which makes them on
average lower between euro countries). We use two di®erent variables that describe bilateral withholding
taxes on dividends (and capital gains) and on interests (from loans, deposits or debt securities), resp.
DividendTaxij and InterestTaxij, in percents. The former should discourage bilateral equity holdings
while the latter should discourage bilateral bond holdings and banking assets
21. Although signi¯cant (at
the 10% level), these variables do not change any of the results concerning the euro e®ects we found (see
table 14 in appendix) .
{ Quantifying the Euro E®ect: the equivalent variation in transaction costs
We can now provide quantitative estimates of the fall in transaction costs due to the Euro. Remember
that transaction costs are lower for all countries (the unilateral liberalization e®ect) and also for countries
within the euro (the preferential liberalization e®ect). We will call the former variation (decrease) in
transaction costs (
¢¿j
¿j ) and the latter (
¢¿ij
¿ij ). The estimated fall depends on our assumed elasticity of
demand (") which may be di®erent for bonds, equities and banking assets.
We use data on bilateral taxation of equity dividends and interests on bonds and banking assets to
estimate this elasticity. According to equation (2), the coe±cient estimated for the bilateral rate of
taxation should be equal to ("¡1). According to our estimates of this coe±cient
22 (table 14 in appendix),
we use the following values: "
equity = "
bankasset = 4 and "
bond = 6:5. As expected, estimates of this
elasticity is higher for bonds than for other assets. These numbers are a bit lower than other estimates
in the literature which found values between 6 and 12 for equities (see Loderer et al. (1991), Wurgler
and Zhuravskaya (2002) and Martin and Rey (2006) for a short survey of those elasticities). However,
the elasticity we estimate is for assets from di®erent countries whereas the literature has focused on the
elasticity between assets of the same country.
20Data from bilateral tax treaties; http://www.ibfd.org
21Those taxes are far from being negligible, ranging from 0% for some agreements to 40%.
22Note that we could also estimate this elasticity for equities by using the coe±cient estimated for returns. The estimated
coe±cient is similar (see table 1) even though not signi¯cant.













While for bonds, we get:
¢¿j
¿j = 14% and
¢¿ij
¿ij = 17%. For banking assets
23,
¢¿j
¿j = 25% and
¢¿ij
¿ij = 1:5%.
Note that despite apparently larger estimates of the Euro e®ect for bonds than for equities, the associated
fall in transaction costs is of the same order of magnitude since bonds are closer substitutes than equities.
If we use higher values for the elasticity of substitution, we obtain smaller estimates for the fall of
transaction costs due to the euro
24.
{ Quantifying the impact of the Euro on the elasticity of substitution between assets
Up to now, we have assumed that the elasticity of substitution between the assets is not a®ected
by the euro. However, as noted by Lane (2006), the euro can be interpreted as both a decrease in
transaction costs and potentially a factor that increases the substitutability of assets of the euro zone.
Can we disentangle these two e®ects? One way is to introduce interaction terms between the euro and
other transaction costs than the euro itself
25. If the euro has increased the substitutability of assets we
should then ¯nd that the e®ect of any transaction costs is larger inside the euro-zone. We perform this
exercise for the dividend tax (for equity), the interest tax (for bonds and banking assets) and for the
common legal system. Only the interaction term for the legal system turns out to be signi¯cant and of
the expected positive sign. This holds for bonds and banking assets but not for equity (see table 3). The
reason why the most natural transaction costs to analyze this question (dividend and interest taxes) do
not yield any result is that they exhibit extremely little variation inside the euro zone. This is not the
case for the legal system for which cross-country variation exists inside the euro zone. Our interpretation
is that remaining ¯nancial frictions (such as legal di®erences) are ampli¯ed within the euro zone because
euro assets are closer substitutes. This evidence suggests that the euro has indeed increased the elasticity
of substitution between assets
26.
The estimates of table 3 provide a way to compare elasticities of substitution between two euro bonds
("
bonds
euro ) with respect to the average elasticity ("
bonds) between two bonds which are not both issued in



















¿ij is not signi¯cantly di®erent from 0
24If we double the value of the elasticity (roughly two standard deviations above the estimated one using international
tax data), we divide by two the estimated decrease in transaction costs.
25An alternative root would be to introduce interaction terms with the returns of the assets. However, two issues make
this di±cult. First, these returns are endogenous and second there is very little variation inside the euro zone.
26Again, it is possible that assets within the Euro zone were already closer substitutes before the introduction of the Euro
due to the convergence of monetary policies for instance. Strictly speaking, with our cross-sectional data, we evaluate the












Legalij-x-NonEuroij .181 .146 .397
¤¤¤
(.111) (.133) (.120)
e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .787 .716 .718
e(F) 725.473 301.683 208.128
Table 3: Gravity Models on world asset holdings with source and destination countries ¯xed-e®ects.
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by
* (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination
country. Control variables are included but not reported.
This suggests that the elasticity of substitution between two euro bonds (banking assets) is three (twice)
times larger than for other bonds (banking assets). Such a di®erence implies that the fall of transaction
costs within the Euro zone (
¢¿ij
¿ij ) is actually biased downwards for bonds (and to a lesser extent for
banking assets). On the one hand, the introduction of the euro has decreased transaction costs between
euro countries (direct e®ect) but on the other hand, it has ampli¯ed the e®ect of any remaining friction
through a higher elasticity of substitution (indirect e®ect). Note that the direct e®ect enhances asset
trade between euro countries while the indirect e®ect plays in the opposite direction. Since we found a
positive euro e®ect, clearly the direct channel dominates the indirect one. Our empirical strategy does
not allow us to disentangle properly these two e®ects (in particular because we do not observe all frictions
between markets) and our measure of the variation of transaction costs inside the Euro zone is somehow
the sum of these two e®ects. However, at least for the legal costs, we can measure the amplitude of this
indirect e®ect. Given our assumed ("
bond), we estimate that di®erences in the legal system act like a 2.5%
transaction cost. Due to an higher elasticity of substitution between euro bonds, the e®ect of these legal
transaction costs is multiplied by 3 inside the euro zone. Hence, the rise in the elasticity of substitution
has been \equivalent" to a 5% increase in legal costs. This means that, the fall of transaction costs within
the euro bonds market (
¢¿ij
¿ij ) necessary to match the data must have been 5% larger (going up to 22%).
Of course, these are very broad estimates but one should keep in mind that this indirect channel might
be larger, depending on the magnitude of the remaining ¯nancial transaction costs inside the Euro area.
Asset Trade Diversion and the Euro? The Example of Scandinavian Countries
The previous section provided new results on the euro e®ect for countries buying assets but not for
countries selling assets. A natural question is whether the introduction of the euro has been detrimental
for countries close to the euro zone but not part of it. Note that according to the theoretical model,
we should expect such a diversion e®ect since EMU has decreased the \¯nancial" price index of euro
16countries, which reduces their demand for assets outside the euro zone.
In other words, do euro countries invest less in countries which have similar characteristics than
the euro countries (geographically close to the euro zone, with similar transaction costs, similar level of
developments, similar diversi¯cation opportunities...) but which decided to stay outside of the euro zone?
The group of Scandinavian countries (namely Denmark, Sweden and Norway) is an interesting group
to test such an hypothesis. This is especially true because Finland joined the euro while the other nordic
countries did not. Of course, one could argue that these countries did not join the euro because they
were less integrated ex-ante to the euro countries. We should, in this case, perform double-di®erences
using data before and after the introduction of the euro to test such an hypothesis. However, given that
we do not have time-series data, we will restrict our analysis to simple-di®erence estimates despite this
empirical caveat. This can be done by adding in the regression an interaction term Euroi-Scandj which
equals one when the source country belongs to the euro and the destination is either Denmark, Sweden
or Norway. We also add a dummy Scandj to control for some speci¯c characteristics of the Scandinavian
countries for the speci¯cation without destination country ¯xed-e®ects
27. Finally, we also add a variable
Scandij, which equals one when both countries are Scandinavian countries and zero otherwise to test some
speci¯c linkages among Scandinavian countries. For this variable, Finland is considered as a Scandinavian
countries since we do not want our results regarding the euro to be driven by the presence of Finland
among the euro countries.
The results are shown table 4 and 5. First, the variable Scandj is large, positive and signi¯cant
(the same order of magnitude than Euroj), so on average, countries exhibit a bias towards Scandinavian
countries for all classes of assets. We do not investigate this question but the existence of publicly
traded large multinationals is a likely reason. However, for equity investment, everything else equal, euro
countries invest less in Scandinavia than the average country. This e®ect is signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero and large: according to table 4 (which should give the most precise estimate), euro countries invest
in equities around 65% less towards these countries than predicted by the country speci¯c factors and
the usual gravity variables. This \asset trade diversion" seems to hold only for equity investment, the
estimated coe±cients for bonds and banking assets being very close to zero and non signi¯cant. This
may be because a signi¯cant portion of bonds in these countries are issued in euro.
Finally, as a robustness check, we test whether this lower level of bilateral equity investment from
euro countries towards Scandinavian countries is also observed in Finland. We add an interaction term
Euroi-Finj in the previous regression. Indeed, it is possible that the euro bias inside the euro zone
does not apply to Finland, which would suggest that Nordic countries are for some unobservable reasons
27In particular, these countries have been historically more integrated to the rest of the world, so we can expect this

























e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .769 .686 .723
e(F) 128.78 62.076 111.105
Table 4: Gravity Models on world asset holdings: the case of Scandinavian countries.
Estimation with source country ¯xed e®ects. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯cance at the
10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors.
Observations are clustered within destination country. The control variables of table 1 and regional dummies of














e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .788 .717 .725
e(F) 863.301 344.616 329.235
Table 5: Gravity Models on world asset holdings: the case of Scandinavian countries.
Estimation with source and destination country ¯xed e®ects. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯-
cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust standard
errors. Observations are clustered within destination country. The control variables of table 2 are included but
not reported.
unattractive for euro investors. As shown in table 6, this is not the case, the euro bias for equities is
actually larger for Finland than for the other euro countries (although not signi¯cantly di®erent). This
suggests that for equity holdings some trade diversion due to the introduction of the euro exists. But
this does not apply to the other types of assets. We could even speculate that equity investment from
the euro zone in Scandinavia has been diverted towards Finland, a country with similar characteristics
but inside the euro zone. Of course, this result must be taken with caution and this hypothesis should
be tested with time-series data.
These results suggest that the European monetary union has made Scandinavian countries which do
















e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .788 .717 .725
e(F) 909.446 355.928 282.779
Table 6: Gravity Models on world asset holdings: the case of Scandinavian countries.
Estimation with source and destination country ¯xed e®ects. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical sig-
ni¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust
standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country. The control variables of table 2 and
regional dummies of destination are included but not reported.
say whether this comes from the elimination of the currency risk or from the creation of an uni¯ed stock
market where the largest ¯rms of the euro zone are quoted.
3.5 Swedish data
To test the robustness of some of these results, we now turn to Swedish data on bilateral asset holdings
and bilateral capital °ows. These data are available for a larger number of countries and for more than
one cross sectional year. However, we loose some information since we have data on outward investment
from Sweden but not on inward investment (moreover we have only one source country, namely Sweden).
3.5.1 Swedish asset holdings
² Data description
The Riksbank provides data on Swedish asset holdings for a very large sample of countries (68 desti-
nation countries
28). This data partially overlap our data on international asset holdings but includes are
larger number of countries and is available for four consecutive years (2001-2004). Like the CPIS dataset,
we have a disaggregation by types of securities (bonds or equities). Finally, for comparison purposes, we
also include banking asset holdings from the BIS for the same sample of countries and the same years.
For stock returns, we use the annual return (in Swedish krona) over the year considered. Since data on
stock returns are not available for the whole set of countries, we also present the regression without stock
returns (column (2) of futures tables).
We keep the same control variables as in the previous section but we had to drop the market capi-
talisation over GDP variable since this variable is not available for this larger set of countries over the
28The original was even larger but due to data availability for some of the control variables, we restrict our sample to 68
countries.
19period 2001-2004. We also had to choose between the common language variable, the legal variable and
the Scandinavian dummy given the large overlap between these variables
29. We decided to keep the legal
one.
We also add an additional control variable that might a®ect bilateral asset holdings: (ExchRateVolatil-
ity) is the log- of bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility calculated using monthly data over the period
1996-2001. Indeed, exchange rate risk might discourage some foreign investments.
² Results
The results are shown in table 7.
equityij equityij bondij bankassetij






(.106) (.121) (.102) (.108)
Retj 1.248
(1.375)
distij .362 -.091 -.893
¤¤ .026





(.295) (.272) (.359) (.246)
ExchRateVolatility .143 .057 -.864
¤¤ -.403










(.439) (.532) (.575) (.508)
Legal 1.273 1.095 .301 .713









(.536) (.451) (.566) (.587)
e(N) 150 265 176 255
e(r2) .884 .732 .832 .727
e(F) 31.313 39.5 74.303 45.431
Table 7: Gravity Models on Swedish foreign asset holdings.
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by *
(resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors and time ¯xed-e®ects. Observations are clustered
within destination country.
Looking only at Swedish foreign asset holdings con¯rm most of the results presented in the previous
section. The impact of bilateral variables (Tradeij or Distij) gives qualitatively very similar estimates
than found using data on world asset holdings. These variables are estimated with the expected sign
when signi¯cant and quantitatively the estimates are not signi¯cantly di®erent from the ones found in
the previous section. We also con¯rm that the euro worked like an unilateral liberalization for Swedish
29Indeed, countries with a legal system considered as similar to the Swedish one are Norway, Denmark, Finland and
Iceland, while countries considered as having the same language as Sweden are Denmark and Norway.
20investors: the portfolio bias towards the euro zone is found quantitatively large for equity and bond
holdings. In particular, the bias of Swedish investors towards euro bonds is larger than for the average
country. The Swedish and and the Euro bonds markets also seem to be particularly well integrated.
Our new variable (ExchRateVolatility) shows up signi¯cantly only for bond holdings. This makes
sense since exchange rate risk is a much larger part of the risk in foreign bond returns than in equity
returns. Quantitatively, this e®ect is non negligible: raising the bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility
by 10% lowers bilateral bond holdings by 8%. Moreover, as we just said, only a small part of the euro
e®ect seems to due to the stability of euro-krona exchange rate.
3.5.2 Swedish capital out°ows
² Data description
The data on Swedish out°ows come from the Balance of Payments statistics which provides data on
aggregate asset purchases in international ¯nancial markets broken down by countries of destination and
by types of assets over the period 1998-2005 (on a quarterly basis). Note that this data are on capital
°ows (and not stocks) and the comparison with results on stocks is per-se interesting. Unfortunately,
we cannot analyze the determinants of Swedish capital in°ows and we must focus our attention on asset
purchases by Swedish investors since we do not have the nationality of Swedish assets buyers. Due to
missing data in the beginning of the period for some countries, we had to restrict the sample to 56
destination countries which are the largest markets. These 56 countries account for about 99% of total
Swedish asset purchases. This dataset gives the nationality of the counter-party which might be di®erent
from the nationality of the asset involved in the transaction, however we will make the assumption that
assets bought by Swedish investors to an investor in a country have been issued in the same country.
This is less an issue for bank loans but might introduce some measurement errors in the series of equities
and bonds purchases. We will partly control for this with our \FinCenterj" dummies.
The dependant variables \purchaseequityij", \purchasebondij" and \loanij" are respectively the ag-
gregate purchases of equities and bonds in country (j) and the aggregate loans towards country (j) over
the quarter.
We use the same control variables as in the previous section but some are now time-varying: GDPij
which is the log of the product of Swedish and country (j)' GDP, Tradeij
30 and Retj. Retj is the averaged
equity return over the last four quarters in Swedish krona
31.
Like for asset holdings, we also add a measure of bilateral exchange rate risk: (ExchRateVolatility)
is the bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility. At a given time (t), (ExchRateVolatility) is the log- of
30As in the previous section, Tradeij is the part of bilateral trade orthogonal to market sizes. Data on bilateral Swedish
trade were provided by Statistics Sweden and include a larger sample of countries than the CHELEM dataset.
31We used annual returns rather than quarterly returns to reduce the importance of extreme events like currency or stock
market crashes. Moreover, given data availability on stock markets returns, we also run regressions without this variable
to reduce data attrition (column (2)).
21the volatility of bilateral nominal exchange rates calculated with monthly data over a ¯ve-year window
before time (t). We also control for foreign direct investment °ows (FDIij) to see whether asset purchases
and FDI are complementary or substitutes. Similarly to the trade variable, FDIij is the log- of bilateral
foreign direct investment out°ows that are not due to market sizes
32.
² Results
The results are shown in table 8. Looking at capital out°ows does not modify qualitatively our results.
The gravity variables (Tradeij or Distij) shows up with the expected sign (when signi¯cant). Compared
to the previous section, only bilateral loans gives very di®erent quantitative estimates. Indeed, they are
much more related to the geographical distance (and not so much a®ected by trade linkages) compared
to the bilateral banking assets. They are also the only bilateral °ows to be weakly (positively) a®ected
by foreign direct investment.
purchaseequityij purchaseequityij purchasebondij loanij
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(.402) (.400) (.323) (.821)
e(N) 766 1105 686 1442
e(r2) .776 .753 .738 .7
e(F) 65.808 62.18 258.859 61.488
Table 8: Gravity Models on out°ows from Sweden.
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp.
** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country. Time
¯xed-e®ects are included but not reported.
32The residual of the regression of bilateral FDI °ows on countries GDPs.
22With respect to the Euro, not surprisingly, we also ¯nd that Sweden trade in assets much more with
Euro countries
33 but more interestingly, if we compare table 7 and 8, this euro bias tends to be larger
for °ows than for stocks (at least for equities and loans). This suggests that the fall in transaction costs
due to the euro is partly due to an increase in the liquidity of euro assets which in turn has increased
the turnover on euro assets. We also con¯rm the impact of bilateral exchange rate volatility on bilateral
bonds °ows (but not equity and loans). Finally, we also ¯nd that bilateral exchange rate volatility reduces
only trading in bonds market but with an higher elasticity for bonds °ows than for bonds holdings.
The Euro Bias: estimation in the time-dimension
One could argue that Sweden larger trade in assets with Euro countries re°ects some unobservable
variables which make these countries especially attractive for Swedish investors and which have nothing
to do with the introduction of the euro. Given the time dimension of this database on capital out°ows,
we can partly deal with this issue. Indeed, our data start in 1998, before the introduction of the Euro
and Greece joined after the other countries (in 2001).
purchaseequityij purchaseequityij purchasebondij loanij
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Euro -.121 .112 1.035
¤¤¤ 3.097
¤¤¤
(.610) (.563) (.324) (.413)
e(N) 766 1105 686 1442
e(r2) .095 .061 .155 .077
e(F) 10.3 4.674 15.869 15.626
Table 9: Gravity Models on out°ows from Sweden.
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by
* (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination
country. Destination country ¯xed-e®ects and control variables of table 9 are included but not reported.
As a consequence, we can estimate the euro e®ect across time as well as across countries, comparing
Sweden's asset trade with a euro country with respect to a non-euro country before and after the intro-
duction of the euro. This can be done by looking at the estimate of our euro dummy once we control for
destination countries ¯xed-e®ect
34. In other words, with this strategy, we control for unobservable speci¯c
factors of euro countries and estimate the change of asset purchases towards these countries before and
after the introduction of the euro. This is however a very restrictive test since we have little variability
in the time dimension. The results are shown in table 9. This con¯rms that the euro had a very strong
e®ect on bonds trading as well as bilateral loans (with comparable estimates), while the e®ect on equity
purchases is no more signi¯cant. We see these results as a con¯rmation of one of the main message of
the paper. The euro acted as a decrease of transaction costs for non-euro countries (like Sweden). This
33Again see table 13 in appendix, for robustness checks with respect to the European Union.
34The country ¯xed-e®ects are assumed to be constant over the period considered. In a non-reported regression, we also
interacted the euro dummy with a time-trend; it did not a®ect our estimates.
23e®ect seems to be more robust for bonds purchases and loans than for equities.
4 Conclusion
Can we draw some welfare implications of our empirical results for countries that are very much integrated
from a commercial and ¯nancial point of view to the European Union but are outside of the euro zone?
They suggest that the euro has had three main e®ects: 1) a unilateral ¯nancial liberalization which makes
it cheaper to buy euro zone assets; 2) a diversion e®ect due to the fact that lower transaction costs inside
the euro zone lead the countries of the zone to purchase less non euro assets; 3) an increase in cross-border
asset holding inside the euro zone which is the counterpart of the diversion e®ect and corresponds to a
preferential ¯nancial liberalization. The ¯rst e®ect should be bene¯cial to non-euro countries as it implies
that it pays less to diversify risk when purchasing euro assets. This could be readily demonstrated in the
model of our theoretical section. The second and third e®ects are the two faces of the same mechanism.
The second is clearly detrimental to non euro countries. If assets are imperfect substitutes (which our
analysis con¯rms), the lower demand for non euro equity (the only asset for which some diversion is
suggested by our empirical analysis) implies a lower price of non-euro assets relative to euro assets. This
implies an increase in the cost of capital for the ¯rms outside the euro zone. At ¯rst sight, the increase in
cross-border ¯nancial trade inside the euro-zone does not a®ect non euro countries (except through the
diversion e®ect already discussed). However, in a model like Martin and Rey (2000) where the number of
assets is endogenous, the increase in cross-border demand and price leads to entry of new assets and an
increase in the possibilities of risk diversi¯cation. Another way to say this is that, above the transaction
cost e®ect, non euro countries should bene¯t from larger, more diversi¯ed ¯nancial markets in the euro
zone. However, the price of those assets should also increase due to the increased demand coupled to
imperfect substitution and transaction costs. Overall, non euro countries should bene¯t from more and
cheaper (in terms of transaction costs) opportunities to diversify ¯nancial risk but with a deterioration
of its ¯nancial terms of trade.
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² International Data on Bilateral Securities Holdings:
Aggregate bilateral bonds and equities holdings in US dollars, in 2001, from the Coordinated Port-
folio Investment Survey. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm
² Bilateral Financial Banking Assets: in US dollars, average over quarterly data in 2001, from
the Bank of International Settlements.
A disaggregation by sector shows that banking assets are for half interbank assets, the rest is
¯nancing of the corporate sector (35%) and of the public sector (15%). A disaggregation by types
of assets show that a big part is loan and deposit (around two thirds) but a non-negligible part
consist in negotiable securities (bonds and equities
35).
See table 10 for a more precise description.
² Bilateral Exports and Imports: in 2001, in US Dollars from the CHELEM dataset (Centres
d'Etudes Propectives et d'Informations Internationales, CEPII, Paris).
² Gdp: from the International Financial Statistics.(Gdp in US dollars in 2001, exchange rates used
are also from the IFS).
² Bilateral Distance: in km, from S{J Wei's website and from various sources (\How far is it ?",
http://www.indo.com/distance )
² Corruption: \Corruption Perception Index" from Transparency International
36 ranking from 0 to
10 (actually we use the opposite of the standard index to have the maximum value for the most
corrupted country)
² Common Language and Colonial Link: various sources (for colonial link, mainly summaries
of country history in Encyclopedias.)
² Legal Variable: mainly La Porta et al. [1998], various sources for missing countries
37.
² Stock Market Returns: monthly data from 1990 to 2000 in UDS Dollars from Martin and Rey
[2002] (World Bank and Bloomberg) and Global Financial Data.
² Market Capitalisation over GDP: Market capitalisation over GDP in 2000 are from the Finan-
cial Structure database of the Worldbank.
35For some countries, namely France and UK, we know that around half of total securities are equities.
36http://www.transparency.org
37http://www.llrx.com
28² Fiscal Variables: IBFD online products (http://www.ibfd.org); Latin American Taxation Database,
European Taxation Database, Asia{Paci¯c Taxation Database, Tax Treaties Database.
² Swedish data on bilateral asset holdings and capital out°ows: Sveriges Riksbank (Balance
of Payments Statistics)
² Swedish data on bilateral trade: Statistics Sweden.
5.2 Country list for data on world asset holdings
² Source Countries (i): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Hong-Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Singapore, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, South
Africa;
² Destination Countries (j):
{ Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United King-
dom, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Poland, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey;
{ Asia: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand;
{ Oceania: Australia, New Zealand;
{ North America: Canada, United States;
{ Central America and South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama;
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .766 .681 .701
e(F) 113.194 96.702 62.658
Table 11: Gravity Models on world asset holdings with source country ¯xed-e®ects
Robustness Check with a EU dummy (Eurcomij) and a dummy for countries inside the EU but outside the euro.
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by
* (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination




























e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .789 .716 .717
e(F) 663.111 292.182 220.488
Table 12: Gravity Models on world asset holdings with source and destination country ¯xed-e®ects
Robustness Check with an EU dummy (Eurcomij)).
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by *
(resp. ** and ***). Robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country.
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(.237) (.219) (.288) (.221)
FDIij -.099 -.099 -.033 .255
¤
(.118) (.110) (.097) (.130)
ExchRateVolatility .192 .342 -2.661
¤¤¤ -.007










(.627) (.414) (.352) (.529)
Eurcom -.095 -.214 .068 2.020
¤¤¤


















(.446) (.418) (.325) (.538)
e(N) 766 1105 686 1442
e(r2) .776 .754 .738 .716
e(F) 71.379 56.146 134.794 58.837
Table 13: Gravity Models on out°ows from Sweden: Robustness Check with EU dummy (Eurcom).
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp.
** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country.



















e(N) 793 835 863
e(r2) .805 .707 .703
e(F) 70.571 59.585 92.004
Table 14: Gravity Models on world asset holdings with source country ¯xed-e®ects.
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by
* (resp. ** and ***). Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination
country. Regional dummies of destination are included but not reported.
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